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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation negotiation is the process by which administrative
agencies sit down with interested parties and negotiate a proposed rule.
Regulation negotiation has become an effective alternative to traditional
agency rulemaking proceedings. The goal of this Comment is to
determine whether regulation negotiation is a viable alternative to the
normal administrative rulemaking process being undertaken in the wetlands
manual debate. Section 1I contains a general discussion of the concept of
regulation negotiation, its advantages and disadvantages, and the criteria
used to determine whether regulation negotiation is appropriate for a
particular rule. Section M briefly describes the wetlands delineation
debate and the manuals at the center of the debate. Section IV applies the
criteria discussed in Section II to the wetlands manual debate and evaluates
the appropriateness of negotiated rulemaking.
H. ADR IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS: NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
A. Concept of Regulatory Negotiation and Negotiated Rulemaking
"Negotiated rulemaking" describes the use of negotiation by an
administrative agency in any decision making process.' Regulatory
negotiation creates the opportunity for the interested parties to exchange
views and ideas using procedures designed to achieve consensus. 2
Regulatory negotiation emerged in the late 1970s as a distinct
administrative law concept because it is better suited to making
administrative agency decisions than traditional rulemaking processes.3
"Negotiated rulemaking," a specific application of regulatory negotiation,
refers to the use of negotiation in the decision making process associated
with rulemaking.' The negotiated rulemaking process is similar to the
1. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The
Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 863, 865 n.1
(1987).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTtATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK 1 (1990) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.].
3. Perritt, supra note 1, at 865-66.
4. ADMINISTRATIVECONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 1.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 1994]
legislative process in many ways.
5
Negotiated rulemaking is the only form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) used by administrative agencies because it is designed to
resolve "interest disputes" while other forms such as mediation, fact-
finding, and arbitration are more suited to "rights disputes."' "Rights
disputes" are resolved by applying set legal standards, or rules of decision,
to facts determined by an adjudicator; "interest disputes," on the other
hand, are characterized by the lack of rules of decision.! The political
process and private negotiations are appropriate venues for interest
disputes because such disputes are resolved when the interested parties sit
down together and devise rules which accommodated all interests
involved.8
Throughout the 1980s, negotiated rulemaking became an
accepted process by which proposed rules could be drafted.' The essence
of negotiated rulemaking is to bring together representatives of the
administrative agency and various interest groups to negotiate the content
of a proposed rule.1" The goal is for the parties to reach a consensus by
evaluating their own priorities and then compromising in order to reach
the desired outcome on the issues most important to them." A rule
reached by concession is easier to implement and less likely to generate
subsequent litigation.'
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), public
participation is not required in the drafting of proposed rules." The
agencies are only required to publish the proposed rule and allow the
public an opportunity to comment. This process is called notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Through contact with those affected by the
proposed rule, the agency acquires important information; either the
agency or the interested parties may initiate the contact."
Negotiated rulemaking uses negotiation and consensus to combine
the resources and energy of the interested parties to solve the problem
presented. This process harnesses the creativity of a group of distinct,
5. Id.
6. Perritt, supra note 1, at 866.
7. Id. at 869.
8. Id.




13. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
14. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 1.
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interested parties focused on proposing better, more acceptable rules."
The adversarial nature of the traditional rulemaking process under
the APA is considered "a major contributor to the expense and delay
associated with regulatory proceedings."" In fact, the traditional
rulemaking process has been perceived as merely the first round of a fight
that will ultimately be decided by a cout of law.1" It has been suggested
that the need to establish a record as the basis for potential litigation down
the road sharpens divisions that may foreclose any willingness of the
parties to acknowledge other views.' Under such circumstances, parties
tend to take extreme positions and to withhold information they view as
potentially damaging to their positions 1? The traditional APA
rulemaking process thus lacks the opportunity for parties to exchange
views and to focus on designing creative solutions to problems.'
The decision to use negotiated rulemaking involves several steps.
First, someone must propose that a rule be considered for negotiated
rulemaking. Although the proposal usually comes from within the agency,
it may also come from an outside affected party or Congress.2 ' Congress
may even require that an agency use negotiated rulemaking for particular
types of proposed rules. '
Second, the agency will usually hire a convener, or neutral
person, to determine what interests are affected by the rule; Philip Harter
has described this process as "an adult version of the children's game
telephone." The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), on the other
hand, has institutionalized the entire negotiated rulemaking process. The
EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Project systematically evaluates rules for
the appropriateness of negotiated rulemaking and makes recommendations
15. Id. at2.
16. Id.
17. Id. This reflects the belief that the process is not effective in reaching
a rule that all affected parties can live with and that disgruntled parties will
go to court to gain satisfaction.
18. ADMINUISTRATIVE CONFERENCEOF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. For example, § 1431 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, as amended in 1988, requires that regulations authorized by the
Secretary of Education be developed in part by negotiated rulemaking. 20
U.S.C.S. § 1431 (Law. Co-op. 1988).
23. Chip Cameron et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution with Emphasis on
Rulemaking Negotiations, 4 ADMIN. Li. 83, 88 (1990-91).
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to the rulemaking staff.' Whether the process is institutionalized or not,
the appropriateness of negotiated rulemaking is determined by applying
certain criteria that may vary slightly from agency to agency.Z
Third, if it appears that negotiated rulemaking will be
recommended, the agency will publish a notice in the Federal Register.
The notice normally states what issues are expected to be deliberated, lists
the various parties that have been contacted, and invites public
comment.' Through public comment, the agency hopes to learn of any
interested parties not represented, whether the issues it picked are correct
and if others exist, and whether negotiated rulemaking is even appropriate
for the proposed rule.'
When an agency proceeds by negotiated rulemaking, it does so
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 2'  and the
negotiation committee essentially becomes a quasi-federal agency.' The
FACA requires that the agency publish notice of the committee meetings
in the Federal Register and that the meetings be open to the public."
B. Criteria For Determining the Appropriateness of Negotiated
Rulemaking
As mentioned above, negotiated rulemaking is not suitable for all
instances of agency rulemaking; limitations on its application exist.
"Negotiation should be viewed as an alternative method of rulemaking to
be used when it is superior to other processes."3 A list of seven criteria
has been used to determine when negotiated rulemaking is appropriate.
First, there must be a limited number of parties or interests
significantly affected by the rule;32 twenty-five is the upper limit, but
each interest can be represented by a caucus or team. A caucus or team
consists of multiple parties with similar interests and can be represented by
a single individual or more.' While twenty-five may appear to be a large
24. Id.
25. For a discussion, see infra Section liB.
26. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 89.
27. Id. at 89.
28. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988).
29. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 89.
30. Id. at 90.
31. Philip J. Hatter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1,
44 (1982).
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at n.258; ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 37;
Cameron, supra note 23, at 87.
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number for one table, only a few of the parties play significant roles in the
negotiations. Negotiation is not appropriate if the regulation affects many
interests in such diverse ways that representation by a few is not possible,
or if a major interest is not sufficiently organized so that a representative
can be selected.'
Second, the issues must be known and ripe for decision. All
necessary parties must be ready to participate; the issues must be
identifiable, and information must be sufficient.' Negotiated rulemaking
is appropriate if "you know what the problem is, and it is ready for
you."
36
Third, no interested party will have to compromise a fundamental
value. A value is fundamental if it is the very purpose of the
organizational interest or an "article of faith."37 Issues can be major and
important and still negotiable, but if an issue rises to the level of an article
of faith then agreement is unlikely, and some alternative forum should be
used. ' As one noted author suggests, "you do not negotiate which is the
better of several religions. "' However, once a conflict of fundamental
values is resolved, "the parties may use the resolution as a basis for
negotiated agreements on individual regulations."' In the regulatory
context, the likelihood of successful negotiation increases the more the
parties agree on the fundamental principles at the root of the decision.4
Fourth, there must be a number of diverse issues. A rule must
involve a number of issues or approaches or there is nothing to
compromise. Interested parties will yield on issues they consider lower
priority in order to improve their position on issues they give higher
priority.' "The whole purpose of negotiation is kind of the Jack Sprat
theory: [w]hat one person values the other person does not value as
much, and you can trade and optimize everybody's satisfaction because
people look at this differential value on the issues. '
Fifth, sufficient countervailing power must exist so that the
outcome is genuinely in doubt. Sufficient countervailing power means that
34. Id.
35. Harter, supra note 31, at 47.
36. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 87-88.
37. Id. at 88; ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 38.
38. Id.
39. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 88.
40. Hartter, supra note 31, at 50.
41. Id. at 49-50.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 88.
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no interested party can accomplish its goal without incurring an
unacceptable sanction." Negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate when
a party has no incentive to negotiate because it possesses the raw power to
dictate the outcome.' The parties to negotiation must believe that the
presence of countervailing powers makes the negotiation process the most
appropriate process."
Sixth, the parties must view negotiation as in their best interests.
Parties must believe that they can achieve more through negotiation than
through any other means. Participants who are not at the table willingly
do not make positive contributions and may even take subsequent actions
to attempt to destroy the product of any discussions.' Success is not
likely in zero sum game situations where a party wins only to the extent
another party loses; therefore the dispute must be transformed into a win-
win situation.48
Seventh, the agency must be willing to use negotiated rulemaking
and to participate in the process. The agency must believe that the direct
discussion characteristic of negotiation will most effectively develop the
proposed rule.49 A senior official with the agency should be an active
participant so that agency views are ineorporated into the deliberations, the
agency feels like a part of the negotiations, and the original purpose for
developing the rule is met.' In this manner, the agency cannot later
reject the proposed rule on the grounds that the rule was not created by the
agency or that a proper balance was not struck.,
C. Advantages of the Negotiated Rulemaking Process
Long-term "benefits flow from the broader participation of the
parties, the opportunity to have creative solutions to regulatory problems,
44. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 38.
45. Id.
46. Hatter, supra note 31, at 46. Some examples of countervailing powers
include: (1) the ability to invoke a proceeding in which a third party will
decide the issue based on governing principles that are not clear enough to
allow prediction of the outcome, (2) the ability to create doubt on the
outcome, and (3) in connection with (1), the ability to inflict costs and delays.
Id.
47. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 38.
48. Hater, supra note 31, at 48.




and the potential of avoiding litigation. ' The negotiated rulemaking
process saves time and resources. Negotiating the proposed rule before it
is published avoids the postpublishing settlement negotiations that often
occur under judicial supervision in programs involving adversarial
rulemaking. s  Regulated businesses will know earlier how the rule will
affect them. Thus, they can plan capital expenditures or product changes
at an earlier time than if they were faced with years of litigation and
uncertainty over the outcome. ' In addition, the public would receive a
more timely schedule of those benefits Congress intended to flow from
promulgation of the rule.5
s
The negotiation process provides the agency with a more complete
understanding of the concerns of the potentially affected parties, the
relative importance to the parties of different regulatory choices, and the
factual grounds for the regulation.5 This is true regardless of whether or
not a consensus is reached.'
The negotiation process focuses on objectivity, such as practical
and empirical concerns, rather than theoretical predictions. Because the
interested parties decide what information is necessary to make an
informed decision, the data can emphasize practical and empirical concerns
rather than simply theoretical predictions.5 ' This emphasis on practical
experience can decrease time and cost to the agency of developing
extensive theoretical data.s9  Negotiation allows agencies to more
accurately understand the costs and benefits of policy alternatives than it
could through adversarial hearings.'
In negotiated rulemaking, the parties focus squarely on their
respective interests instead of advocating and maintaining extreme
positions as in the normal rulemaking process. 1 Negotiated rulemaking
enables the participants to grasp an understanding of the important issues
and then act accordingly to accomodate the various competing interests."
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Hater, supra note 31, at 30.
59. Id.
60. Henry H. Pefrtt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEo. LJ. 1625, 1627 (1986).
61. Harter, supra note 31, at 29.
62. Id.
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In a negotiation, the parties can rank their concerns and then negotiate
away their lesser concerns in order to get what they really want.' In
traditional rulemaking, the agency may not be able to anticipate how
strongly a party views the various provisions of the proposed rule; in
negotiated rulemaking, an interested party can accomodate the concerns of
one or more of the other parties in order to receive concessions on a
critical point."
Negotiation permits the affected interests "greater control over the
content of agency rules while ensuring fairness and balanced
participation."" Negotiation enfranchises parties who have important
interests at stake but who may be relatively quiet or feel they have little
bargaining power under the traditional rulemaking process.' The
dynamic nature of negotiating rules forces each party to participate in
drafting a solution. If a party is dissatisfied with a proposed solution, the
other 'parties will press for finding an alternative proposal that might
satisfy it.'7 The diversity of the parties at the negotiating table allows for
a higher level of creativity in crafting solutions than if the rule were
drafted by the agency alone.'
D. Disadvantages of the Negotiated Rulemaking Process
Despite its potential for significant long-term savings, negotiated
rulemaking is resource intensive in the short term for the agency and for
the parties.' The agency must employ a convener and a mediator, and it
must assign a senior manager to sit at the negotiation table. Also, the
compression of the rulemaking schedule may require the allocation of staff
and technical contractor resources for use over a shorter period of time
than in the traditional rulemaking process."0 The compression of the
internal review process during negotiations adds to the administrative
burden on those personnel assisting the agency's representative, not to
mention those who must pick up the slack created by the time demand of
negotiations.'
63. Id.
64. Id. at 29-30.
65. Perritt, supra note 60, at 1627.
66. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
71. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 5.
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Outside interested parties may also have to spend more resources
and staff time than is normally spent on traditional rulemaking.
Participation in negotiations brings with it the responsibility to review
additional documents and to generate ideas, proposals, and data that
require significant time and resources to develop.' A rule must be of
significant importance to a group before it will commit the time and
resources to participate in the negotiation process.n
III. HISTORY OF WETLAND IDENTIFICATION AND DELINEATION
In the spring of 1988, presidential candidate George Bush
promised the American people "no net loss" of wetlands. 4 This theme
was developed by the Wetlands Policy Forum, a group consisting of state
and federal officials, private industry representatives, and environmental
advocates.' Buried in this catchy and seemingly benign slogan,
however, was the question of what exactly constitutes a wetland for federal
regulatory purposes.' Shortly after George Bush settled into the oval
office, this question became a debate that has escalated into one of the
most controversial regulatory issues of our times. Conservationists pushed
for preservation while private property owners pushed for the protection of
property rights. 7
A. Pre-1989 Wetlands Manual
Prior to 1989, four federal administrative agencies had their own
respective procedures for identifying and delineating wetlands: the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers (CE), the
Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service (SCS), and the
Department of Interior Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). For wetlands
subject to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,' the CE and EPA each
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Anthony Thompson & Steven Tabacknian, Critics All Wet on Wetlands
Proposal, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1992, at 23.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Jeffrey P. Cohn, How We: Must A Wetland Be?, NAT'L J. GOV'T EXEC., Mar.
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
78. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1990) (granting the EPA and CE
concurrent authority over permitting the discharge of dredged or fill material
into navigable waters, including wetlands).
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developed individual manuals in 1987 and 1988, respectively." The
problem was not only that each agency had its own manual, but that the
manuals were not nationally implemented standards within the agencies.
Delineation and identification were inconsistent between and within the
agencies.'m  The SCS adopted procedures for national use by the
Department of Agriculture in 1987 for purposes of the "Swampbuster"
provision of the Food Security Act of 1985.' In 1979, the FWS
established guidelines in the form of its official wetland classification
system report.82 The different approaches meant inconsistent
designations, and this was particularly obvious in the Clean Water Act.
B. 1989 Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional
Wetlands
In early 1988, the CE and EPA resumed their discussion of
combining their manuals to create a national standard, and they invited the
SCS and FWS to join them.' The end product was the Federal Manual
for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands, which was
published on January 10, 1989.5 The 1989 Manual established a
national standard for wetland identification and delineation and terminated
any locally implemented approaches that were not consistent. SS
What came out of the 1989 Manual were four wetland definitions
that were conceptually the same in that they focus on three basic elements
for identifying wetlands: (1) wetland hydrology (permanent or periodic
inundation or soil saturation or both), (2) hydrophytic plants (characteristic
plants), and (3) hydric soil (characteristic soils)."s The FWS and SCS
definitions contain certain exceptions that are specific to their respective
organic statutes.
79. 1989 "Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional
Wetlands'; Proposed Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446, 40,449 (proposed Aug. 31,
1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 40,450.
82. Id. at 40,449.
83. Id.
84. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S.D.A. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, FEDERAL
MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 MANUAL].
85. Id.
86. 1989 "Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Wetlands';
Proposed Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446, 40,451 (proposed Aug. 31, 1991).
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The 1989 Manual has created a great deal of controversy by
effectively expanding the definition of wetlands, or at least the agencies'
interpretations of the definition. It has been estimated that the 1989
Manual almost doubled the estimated 100 million acres of land previously
identified as wetlands.' Naturally, the criticism has come from farmers,
real estate interests, and the oil industry while support has come from
environmentalists, commercial fisherman, and duck hunters.' What
started out as a scientific manual to be used as a guide to designating
wetlands has become a policy document that critics argue amounts to a
government taking.5'
While congresspersons were busy introducing bills aimed at
reducing the scope of section 404, the Bush administration appointed an
interagency wetlands task force under the White House's Domestic Policy
Council in 1990." Task force deliberations led to an agreement between
the EPA and the Vice President's Competitiveness Council to propose a
revised delineation manual in August of 1991.' The proposed 1991
manual uses the 1989 Manual's three criteria to identify vegetated
wetlands.' All three criteria are mandatory although exceptions under
certain circumstances do exist."3 However, the proposed 1991 manual
narrows the definition of a wetland by lengthening the time soil must be
saturated and changing vegetation requirements."4 The proposed
revisions were intended to improve the methodology for delineating
wetlands while at the same time taking into consideration the policy
implications of delineation.'
87. Thompson & Tabackman, supra note 74, at 23.
88. New Administration Wetlands Policy Focuses On Definition, Pennit Process, 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 1052 (Aug. 16, 1991).
89. Cohn, supra note 77.
90. Id.
91. See 1989 *Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional
Wetlands; Proposed Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,466 (proposed Aug. 31, 1991).
92. Wetlands that are vegetated under normal circumstances are
considered *vegetated wetlands' for the purposes of the proposed 1991 manual.
93. 1989 "Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Juridictional
Wetlands"; Proposed Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446, 40,452 (proposed Aug. 31,
1991).
94. New Administration Policy Focuses on Definition, Pemit Process, supra note 88,
at 1052; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446, 40,452 (proposed Aug. 31, 1991) (proposing a
revision requiring wetlands be covered with water for 15 consecutive days or
saturated to the surface for 21 consecutive days during the growing season in
most years). But see 1989 MANUAL, supra note 84 (requiring wetlands to be
saturated eighteen inches below ground for seven consecutive days).
95. Thompson & Tabackman, supra note 74, at 23.
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This time scientists and conservationists are criticizing and
protesting the proposed revisions. Environmental groups warn that at least
half of the nation's remaining wetlands will be excluded under the
proposed manual.' Critics also maintain that the proposed manual will
cost tens of billions of dollars through the loss of pollution and flood
control provided by wetlands?7
IV. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND THE WETLANDS DEBATE
Some commentators feel that because the wetlands designation
issue is fundamentally a policy issue, it is proper that the new manual be
"subjected to the highest level of public comment, policy review, and
political accountability. "' The goal of this section is to apply the criteria
discussed in Section IIB. in order to determine if negotiated rulemaking
would have avoided the regulatory impasse that the wetlands debate has
created.
A. Application of the Criteria
1. Are a limited Number of Parties or Interests Significantly
Affected by the Proposed Manual?
There are a myriad of individual interests affected by the
identification and delineation of wetlands. However, the interests affected
by the proposed manual can be broken down generally into six categories:
private landowners, developers, scientists, government policymakers,
conservationists, and resource users. There are basically two sides of the
fence; one side argues that the wetlands definition should be narrow while
the other predictably argues that it should be broad.
2. Are Issues Known and Ripe for Decision?
Although there seems to be some debate between scientists as to
which criteria are better suited to wetland designation, the economic,
constitutional, and environmental implications ultimately turn the debate
into one about policy. Do we define wetlands broadly so as to protect the
96. Environmental, Economic Harm Predicted If 1991 Revisions to Wetlands Manual
Adopted, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2176 (Jan. 24, 1992).
97. Id.
98. Thompson & Tabackman, supra note 74, at 23.
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biological, purifying, and flood control aspects? Do we define wetlands
narrowly in order to avoid the flood of takings cases by private
landowners? Which scientific methodology is better suited to my policy
goals? Whose policy goals matter? How do we take into consideration
the regional differences in wetlands? The issue - how to define wetlands
for purposes of federal regulation - is ripe; the subissues are identifiable;
the parties are ready to participate, and the information is sufficient, albeit
controversial.
3. Will an Interested Party Compromise a Fundamental Value?
If a particular group's organizational purpose is either preserving
wetlands or protecting farmers' interests, does that mean the identification
and delineation of wetlands rises to the level of an "article of faith" for
that group? The issue that is really being negotiated is not what is a
wetland, but rather what wetlands will be protected by federal statute.
However, perhaps these two issues cannot be effectively separated for the
purpose of negotiation. It is possible that a party on either side of the
identification and delineation debate may, for ideological reasons, be
incapable of compromising its view. However, the agency should not
abandon an attempt at negotiation merely on the assumption that a party
will not compromise. 9
99. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 104. Neil Eisner cites as an example an
issue the FTC faced regarding access of the handicapped to transportation.
Based on dealings in the past, the FTC felt that the party representing the
handicapped would not be willing to compromise on a civil rights issue.
However, the party in fact felt that there was room for compromise and
suggested a negotiation. Id.
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4. Are There a Number of Diverse Issues?
The debate over what wetlands will be protected by federal
regulation presents many diverse issues. How do you define a wetland
when some wetlands are not always wet, and some do not support
vegetation? Can you really devise a national standard or should there be
regional standards? Should the landowner be compensated for wetlands
they cannot develop? These diverse issues will provide the negotiating
parties with leverage.
5. Are There Sufficient Countervailing Powers?
The last three years provide a pretty obvious answer to this
question. Both the 1989 Manual and the proposed 1991 manual have
attracted sufficient criticism to make the policymakers nervous enough to
initiate change. Both manuals were heavily criticized by the opposition,
which had enough clout to cause reconsideration.
6. Is it in the Best Interests of the Interested Parties to Use
Negotiation?
The 1989 Manual was created without public comment, and it has
cost the agencies and outside interested parties considerable time and
resources. The proposed 1991 manual had attracted 70,000 comments to
the EPA by the middle of February of 1992V0o The cost of processing
all those comments in terms of time and resources is quite a burden.
Given the nature of this issue, it seems unlikely that the interested parties
will be satisfied with a normal notice-and-comment rulemaking. Probably
the biggest incentive for the interested parties to make negotiations work is
the realization that otherwise the agencies will make the determination on
their own.
7. Will the Agencies Want to Participate?
When looking at the amount of time it has taken to move through
the normal rulemaking processes, an argument certainly exists that the
agencies would be willing to negotiate. The time and resources put into
gathering data and processing all the comments from interested parties will
be a tremendous burden on the agencies, especially the EPA. The
100. Processing of Comments to Continue Despite Possible NAS Study, Official Says, 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 2417 (Feb. 21, 1992).
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administrators must realize that this rule will not be based solely on the
scientific data available but rather on the data that best supports the policy
goals of the administration. Therefore, it makes sense for agencies to
bring the interested parties together when setting these policy goals.
B. Evaluation of the Appropriateness of Negotiated Rulemaking
The goal of negotiations would be to propose an identification and
delineation rule that could accommodate all interested parties' desire to
reach a consensus. Four observations come to mind when applying the
criteria to the proposed rulemaking.
First, the number of interested parties is substantial. On the
government side there are the four agencies, the wetlands task force, and
Dan Quayle's Competitiveness Council. On the technical side, there are
those scientists whose data support a narrow definition and those whose
data support a broad definition of wetlands. On the public side, there are
conservationists and others who argue for a broad definition and
landowners and developers who argue for a narrow definition. One
question to address is whether various interests can be caucused into
twenty-five seats.
It is possible to place the various interest groups into three basic
categories: (1) those who believe landowners should be able to use their
land as they please, even if it means destroying important ecology; (2)
those who believe we should preserve all wetlands, even if it causes
substantial economic loss to landowners and communities; and (3) those
realists who recognize the futility of the polar views. Even though each
interested party may have its own distinctive motivations, these three
categories encompass the final goals of al parties. Looking at the
situation in this perspective, it is not unrealistic to believe that all the
interested parties can be effectively represented at a negotiation table with
twenty-five seats.
Second, the debate is of a very scientific and technical nature.
This fact is not necessarily fatal; in fact, several EPA regulations have
been successfully negotiated despite their highly technical natures."'
However, it would be foolish to argue that the debate is purely scientific
even though science is at the very heart of it. In reality, the debate is
scientific, economic, and political. Each side has its scientists to reinforce
101. Cameron et a., supra note 23, at 96. Examples of successfully
negotiated technical regulations include: regulations governing the remedy
for asbestos in public schools, 40 C.F.R. §§ 763.80-.99 (1988), and regulations
affecting the design of wood stoves for decreased air pollutant emissions, 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.530-.539b (1989). Id.
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its public policy or economic arguments. Scientific complexity would not
be an impediment to negotiation in this case because policy and economics
are strong ingredients. However, because the rule is complicated by its
technical and scientific nature, it will be important for the committee to
marshall the data and analysis required for an efficient and intelligent
negotiation.'c
Third, the issue of whether the designation of land as wetlands
constitutes a compensable taking cannot be ignored. Indeed, the issue is at
the very center of the landowners' argument. The ownership of real
property can open many doors of opportunity for the owner, particularly
economic ones. One can argue that the issue of what an individual does
with private property rises to the level of an article of faith. However,
nuisance law requires a landowner to use property in a way that does not
threaten the public health, safety, and welfare. The taking and property
rights arguments are bargaining tools that can be brought to the table but
should not prevent the negotiation from succeeding.
Fourth, the debate is clearly political. The negotiated rulemaking
process gives the parties the opportunity to reconcile the political
differences surrounding the rule, much like in the legislative process.10
Traditional rulemaking, on the other hand, tends to omit the political
dimension, which may later hamper successful rulemaking.G
In the wetlands debate, not only are the individual agencies that
will administer the rule involved, but the Competitiveness Council and the
administration are involved as well. The issue is not merely a marginal
political issue, but rather an important political issue involving campaign
promises and economics.
Negotiated rulemaking is appropriate for a highly political issue;
yet at the same time, the political nature of an issue may render the
process inappropriate or destined to fail. The fact that the negotiation
meetings are open and geared to include all affected parties makes the
process appropriate for political issues." s  Traditional rulemaking,
although it invites public comment, is not as open.
Negotiated rulemaking may not succeed if the issues to be decided
are linked to fundamental values or to setting precedent, and the linkage
manifests itself politically."' Here, the issue of how to identify and
designate a wetland is linked politically to whether there will be "no net
102. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 101.
103. Id. at 87.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 100.
106. Id.
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loss" and to whether real estate interests will be affected adversely. The
ongoing disagreement between the EPA, which administers the permitting
process, and the Competitiveness Council, which represents the interests
of the country's business sector, indicates the political nature of the issue.
The particular way in which the linkage manifests itself will determine
whether politics will prevent successful negotiation.1"
V. CONCLUSION
Negotiated rulemaking would have given the parties affected by
the Wetlands Manual an opportunity to meet with the agencies and to
develop a consensus on how a wetland is defined for purposes of the Clean
Water Act. Even if the negotiation did not end in a consensus, the
agencies would have had the opportunity to see what rule would be most
fair. The greatest impediment to the success of a negotiated rulemaking of
the wetlands issue is the political atmosphere of the debate.
One would normally assume that what constitutes a wetlands
should be and can only be determined by scientific principles. However,
the economic and political impact of the rule has become just as important,
if not controlling. The consensus will be a definition of a wetland that is
based, not on pure science, but on science manipulated by politics and
economics.
The wetlands debate is merely another example of the dilemma
environmental protection presents today: How far do we go to effectively
preserve, conserve, and protect our natural resources? Wetlands provide
flood control, water purification, fish and wildlife habitats, biological
diversity, recreation opportunities, and natural beauty.108 However,
wetlands can also be filled or drained for development or farming, thereby
bringing income to the owners and economic development to the
community.
107. Cameron et al., supra note 23, at 100.
108. Thompson & Tabackman, supra note 74, at 23.
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There is no better forum for effectively settling such dilemmas
than a negotiation. The political nature of the issues may be an
impediment, but that bridge should be crossed when it is reached. With
the benefit of hindsight, one can now conclude that negotiated rulemaking
could have avoided the lengthy debate that has ensued by bringing
representatives of the affected interests together to negotiate a proposed
delineation manual. Perhaps, it is not too late to bring the affected
interests together and at least attempt to reach a consensus through
negotiated rulemaking.
J. Gregory Smith
